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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HO'V ARD F. SEYBOLD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
UXIOX P .A.CIFIC RAILROAD 
CO:JIP .... \.NY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 7641 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
At the oral argument counsel for the defendant rail-
road company conceded that the testimony introduced 
in this case would support a finding that the railroad 
company was negligent. This placed the emphasis upon 
the existence of contributory negligence of plaintiff. 
Because this matter of contributory negligence becomes 
of so much importance in the case we feel that certain 
matters were not brought out as clearly as they could 
have been at the argument. The above concession had 
not been made at the time counsel for plaintiff had made 
his argument and therefore he did not sufficiently stress 
the three propositions which we desire to present in this 
reply brief. 
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We desire particularly to call to the Court's atten-
tion that contributory negligence is an affirmative de-
fense and the burden res.ts upon the defendant to estab-
lish this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The presumption is that the plaintiff was in the exercise 
of ordinary care for his own safety. The presence or 
absence of lights on the caboose is only material so far as 
it relates to the question of plaintiff's contributory 
negligence. 
Much stress was placed upon the proposition that 
plaintiff's testimony of the lack of lights and warnings 
was negative testimony and did not present a jury ques-
tion. vV e submit that this evidence made a question for 
the jury. We will call cases to the court's attention on 
this subject. 
The third and last proposition we desire to present 
is that plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial. A jury has 
been made the tribunal charged with the responsibility 
of determining disputed questions of fact. In this case 
the testimony given by plaintiff and by defendant is in 
conflict and the resolving of this dispute is peculiarly 
within the province of the jury. This Court should not 
permit a trial judge to usurp the functions of the jury 
and this Court should not usurp the function of the jury 
by upholding the trial court in his ruling in this case 
that defendant should prevail as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS UPON THE DEFENDANT 
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TO ESTABLISH CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ALL 
DEFENDANT DID WAS MAKE A JURY QUESTION ON 
THIS MATTER. 
POINT II. 
THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY PLAINTIFF OF LACK 
OF LIGHTS OR WARNINGS ON THE CABOOSE IS SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS A FINDING 
OF NO LIGHTS OR WARNINGS. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL AND 
THE COURTS SHOULD NOT USURP THE FUNCTIONS 
OF A JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS UPON THE DEFENDANT 
TO ESTABLISH CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ALL 
DEFENDANT DID WAS MAKE A JURY QUESTION ON 
THIS MATTER. 
It is well established in this jurisdiction that the 
defense of contributory negligence is an affirmative de-
fense and that the burden of proof rests upon the de-
fendant to prove plaintiff's contributory negligence by 
a preponderance of the evidence. Rogers v. Rio Grande 
Western Ry. Co., 32 Utah 367, 90 P. 1075, 125 Am. St. 
Rep. 876; Clark v. Union Pac. R. Co., 70 Utah 29, 257 
P. 1050. 
As pointed out in the Clark case, the burden of proof 
being upon the defendant the presumption ·or inference 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary is that the 
plaintiff was in the exercise of reasonable care. See also 
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Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 
P. 97; Evans v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 37 Utah 431, 
108 P. 638. In the Evans case the trial court instructed 
the jury as follows : 
"* * * 'It is the presumption of law that 
every man exercises due care for his own safety 
when in a place of danger, and the presumption 
is that the deceased did so when he approached 
the crossing. * * * The court instructs the jury 
that the plaintiffs need not affirmatively prove 
that the deceased looked and listened for the train 
before coming upon the crossing. The presump-
tion is that he did so, and the burden of proof that 
he did not is on the defendant railway company, 
and it must be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence.' " 
The court in discussing this instruction stated: 
"* * * It is conceded by counsel for appellant 
that those excerpts, in the absence of a;ll evidence, 
do correctly state an abstract rule or proposi-
tion of law, but it is urged that it was e·rror to 
give them in this case, because there were eye-
witnesses to what occurred just before· and at the 
time of the collision, and hence, it is contended, 
there was nothing left upon which a legal pre-
sumption could operate. It is further strenuously 
insisted that in view that appellant in its answer 
set up and relied on the plea of contributory 
negligence·, and since the evidence upon that plea 
was before the jury, therefore the respondents 
could not be permitted to throw the presump-
tion referred to in the instruction into the balance 
to be weighed by the jury against the evidence 
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in support of appellant's plea of contributory 
negligence. Had the court done this by giving 
the instruction complained of, the contention of 
counsel would be sound. This is well illustrated 
by the authorities cited by counsel in support of 
their contention. But we are of the· opinion that 
such "~as neither the intended nor the actual ef-
fect of the language used by the court in the two 
instructions quoted from above. What was said 
by the court \vas, in effect, no more than to call 
the jurors' attention to the fact that the burden 
of proof upon the plea of contributory negligence 
was upon appellant; and, unless such negligence 
was established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence upon that subject, then the respondents 
must prevail as to that issue." 
The testimony introduced by plaintiff shows that he 
stopped, looked and listened. The jurors saw and heard 
the plaintiff testify and they saw and heard the other 
witnesses who gave testimony in conflict with his. The 
burden of proof \-Vas on the defendant to show that plain-
tiff failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. 
To hold that the defendant has sustained this burden and 
has established as matter of law that plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence certainly is not justified by 
the testimony in this case. 
Counsel for the defendant contended at the oral 
argument that the plaintiff looked to the left only at the 
time he stopped for the flasher light west of the team 
track, and that he did not thereafter look to the left or 
north. Counsel further contended that the plaintiff kept 
his eyes glued upon the engine standing upon the main 
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line track and the road ahead. We challenge these state-
ments as being incorrect. Plaintiff, on his direct testi-
mony, testified ( R. 20) : 
"Q. Mr. Seybold, after you signaled for 
this turn and stopped at the crossing, tell us 
what you did after that~ 
"A. Well, I noticed the engine setting there, 
the lights flashing, and I knew it was safe to go 
due to the fact that the engine was the vehicle 
that was making the lights work, so then I shifted 
gears into first, and proceeded across the cross-
Ing. 
"Q. As you went across the crossing, Mr. 
s.eybold, what did you do concerning these other 
tracks~ 
"A. I don't see just what you mean there. 
"Q. Did you continue to watch the engine~ 
"A. Yes, I more or less kept my eyes on the 
engine, and road, too, straight ahead." 
The meaning to be· ascribed to this testimony is 
clear. The plaintiff in proceeding over the crossing 
looked at the road and looked at the engine. The fact 
that he looked at the road and the engine did not pre-
clude his looking to the left along the passing track upon 
which came the caboose. His 13Jlguage is that he "rriore 
or less" kept his eyes on the engine and road. Plaintiff 
on cross-examination testified that after he came to the 
"absolutely dead stop" west of the crossing he at that 
time saw the engine and he was then asked (R. 39): 
"Q. You then proceeded across~ 
"A. That is right." 
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He "~as then asked: 
HQ. Did you look along this track to the 
left~ 
'~A. No sir. 
"Q. Did you see anything~ 
~~ .... \. I didn't see anything." 
And after being asked about looking along this team 
track he \Yas asked concerning the passing track and an-
swered as follows: 
'~Q. Did you look along the passing track 
to your left~ 
'"A. It was quite dark there, and that loco-
motive headlight was flashing across the crossing. 
I looked, I couldn't see anything at that time. 
"Q. Did you look up this track to your left~ 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. You said you didn't see anything~ 
"A. That is right." 
A reasonable interpretation of this evidence is that 
plaintiff looked to the left after he proceeded from his 
stopped position and he looked as he traversed the 
crossing. It appears that plaintiff testified on a num-
ber of occasions that he did not see anything. Counsel 
for defendant at the oral argument and in their brief 
assert that this means he did not look. This merely re-
flects the extent to which defendant must go to prevail 
on this appeal. The only reasonable interpretation that 
could be made is that plaintiff looked but did not see the 
caboose. The plaintiff's mind in so testifying was focused 
upon whether or not he \vas able to see a car proceeding 
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southerly on the passing track. He says he did not see 
anything. He said he looked. This testimony should be 
sufficient to make a jury question on whether or not he 
was guilty of contributory negligence. 
There is nothing in this testimony which is im-
probable. The physical facts do not in any way detract 
from the weight of plaintiff's testimony. The other vv-it-
nesses testified contrary to plaintiff but certainly this 
case is no different from the ordinary case where wit-
nesses testify contrary to one another. The simple ques-
tion is whom do you believe~ The jury was in a position 
to determine which of the witnesses it would believe 
and in making a determination that plaintiff was the one 
upon whom it would place credence it was merely carry-
ing out its function. In order for a court to entirely 
disregard his testimony it would have to come within 
the rule· announced in 20 Am. Jur. 1033, Evidence, Section 
1183, as follows : 
"Testimony Manifestly Untrue, Incredible, or 
Impossible.-The mere fact that testimony given 
by a witness in support of an issue is not plaus-
ible does not destroy all probative value. Where, 
however, the testimony of a witness is incredible, 
inherently or physically impossible and unbeliev-
able, inherently improbable and irreconcilable 
with, or contrary to, physical facts and common 
observation, and experience, where it is so op-
posed to all reasonable probabilities as to be mani-
festly false or is contrary to the laws of nature 
or to well-known scientific principles, or where it 
cannot be said to amount to substantial evidence 
of the facts testified to or accepted as a basis 
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out evidentiary value, even though uncontra-
dicted. Thus, the testimony of one who says he 
looked but did not see an object, which, if he- had 
looked, he in the nature of things must have seen, 
cannot be credited, although such a conclusion is 
not adopted or applied where by reason of the 
surrounding conditions, it was possible for him to 
look and still not see. It is often said, however, 
that an extraordinary case is required to author-
ize the court to regard sworn testimony as mani-
festly impossible and untrue." 
Certainly this is not one of those extraordinary 
cases which call for the application of this rule. If 
twenty witnesses testified contrary to plaintiff's testi-
mony, still it would be a question for the- jury to deter-
mine whom they would believe. 
There is no contradictory evidence on the propo-
sition of whether plaintiff stopped, looked and listened. 
This is understandable because in the ordinary case wit-
nesses cannot be found who could testify that the driver 
of an automobile either did or did not look or listen. 
Plaintiff testified that he looked as he, proceeded across 
the crossing and he testified that he did not see any-
thing. His failure to see the approach of the car could 
be attributable- to the darkness, the background created 
.by the locomotive, the difference in the lighted area in 
front of the locomotive and the darkness to the rear and 
to the lack of lights on the caboose as it stealthily crept 
along the passing track and into the crossing. The bur-
den was upon defendant to. establish that plaintiff did 
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not look. There is a failure upon the defendant's part 
to introduce testilnony which would require a finding 
that plaintiff did not look. 
The proper view to take of a case such as this one 
is found in Doty v. Southern Pac. Co., 186 Or. 308, 207 
P. 2d 131. In that case plaintiff drove an automobile 
o~er a crossing consisting of six tracks. A train collided 
with the automobile. Plaintiff contended that there were 
boxcars and a S"\vitch engine which obstructed her vie·w 
and required part of her attention on tracks other than 
the one along which came the engine which collided with 
her. Defendant in that case contended that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law. 
The court clearly pointed out the effect of the rule that 
the burden of proof is upon the defendant. The court 
stated: 
"* * * Because of such alleged failure on the 
part of plaintiff to look and listen, defendant 
argues that she was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. The burden of proving 
that plaintiff did not listen was on the defend-
ant; it was a part of its defense. It was not in-
cumbent on plaintiff to prove that she did listen. 
Moreover, the jury might at least have inferred 
that she was listening, from her testimony that 
as she p-assed the scale track she glanced to her 
right 'and there was nothing coming that I could 
see, and I didn't hear anything.' There is also the 
presumption that she did her duty." 
After discussing and conside-ring Baltimore & 0. R. 
Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S·. 66, 48 S. Ct. 24, 72 L. Ed. 167, 
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56 A.L.R. 6-!5 and Pokora v. Trabash Railu·ay Co., ~92 
l"T.S. 98, 5-! S. Ct. 380, 78 L. Ed. 11-19, the court stated at 
page 141: 
·'The question for determination in the in-
stant case is \Yhether plaintiff exercised the care 
\Yhich a reasonably cautious person would have 
used under the circumstances. Obviously, the care 
\Yhich a traveler upon a highway is required to 
exercise in approaching and crossing railroad 
tracks is not such care as would, under all the 
circlunsta.nces, prevent injury. 
--~Iany questions present themselves for con-
sideration in determining whether Mrs. Doty was 
guilty of contributory negligence. Some of them 
are: Was the speed at which Mrs. Duty was driv-
ing too fast~ If so, at what speed should she have 
driven her car~ Should she have stopped the car 
before p-roceeding across the main line track~ 
If so, where should she have stopped~ Was there 
a zone of safety where she could have stopped 
after the point of clearance had been reached~ 
Should she have stopp.ed on the passing track, 
on the scale track, or partly on each~ Should she, 
before reaching the scale track, have stopped her 
car, got out and reconnoitred~ As Mrs. Doty pro~ 
ceeded across the tracks, at what point could she 
have first seen the approaching train~ Should 
she have seen it at that point~ If she did not see 
it at that point, was she negligent as a matteT of 
law~ Should she have looked continuously to her 
right as she app-roached the main line track~ If 
so, from what point should she have begun to so 
look~ Would the presence of the switch engine 
to her left affect her duty to look to her right~ 
Had she seen the approaching train, could she 
have stopped her car in time to avoid a collision~ 
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"Unless we can say, as a matter of law, that 
Mrs. Doty's failure to have seen or heard the train 
in time to have avoided a collision 'was negligence 
so obvious and certain that one conclusion and one 
only is permissible for rational and candid minds', 
the question whether she was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence was for the judgment of the jury." 
' 
See also good discussions on contributory negligence, 
the burden of the defendant and the province of the jury 
in Clark v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra; Fish v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 173 Or. 294, 143 P. 2d 917; Hoffman v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 101 Cal. App. 218, 281 P. 681; Cooper v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 43 Cal. App. 2d 693, 111 P. 2d 689; lfough v. 
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 133 Kan. 757, 3 P. 2d 499; 
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Deneen, 167 F. 2d 799. 
We respectfully submit that there was substantial 
evidence given by the only witness who could actually 
testify to his own conduct, that he did in fact stop, look 
and listen along the tracks in such a method that whether 
or not he prop.erly performed these duties became a 
question to be determined by the jury. Hence, the trial 
court was in error in holding as matter of law only a 
verdict against plaintiff could be returned. 
POINT II. 
THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY PLAINTIFF OF LACK 
OF LIGHTS OR WARNINGS ON THE CABOOSE IS SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS A FINDING 
OF NO LIGHTS OR WARNINGS. 
Many cases discuss the difference between so-called 
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affir1native and negative testimony. Some assert that 
negative testimony 'vill not be considered to conflict 
"~ith positive testimony and that therefore where both 
exist a finding must be n1ade in accordance with the posi-
tive testin1ony. 
However, it should be noted that in the determina-
tion of the existence or nonexistence of the light the 
defendant in these railroad cases usually asse,rts that 
there 'vas. a light and the plaintiff- that there was not. 
Of necessity plaintiff's testimony must be negative in 
character because that which he seeks to pro:ve is nega-
tive. If it were true that negative testimony was never 
to be believed, then plaintiffs in these cases would fail 
every time and it would be impossible for a person to 
prove a negative. However, where a witness is in a posi-
tion 'vhere he could see a light or hear a signal and he 
testifies that he did not hear or see, a jury question 
is presented and such testimony is not considered nega-
tive. 
While we are considering this p,roposition we should 
also keep in mind the fact that the controversy here 
over the existence of a light is not the usual one where 
plaintiff is claiming its nonexistence to establish negli-
gence upon the part of the defendant. The defendant 
here does not now assert the evidence was insufficient 
to sustain a finding of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant. We have here a situation where the defendant 
has the burden of proving the existence of the light in 
order to establish that if plaintiff had looked he would 
have seen. All of the cases which we have read have 
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considered this positive and negative testimony in de-
termining whether or not the defendant was negligent. 
The most recent case on this subject in Utah is the 
case of Hudson v. Union Pac. R. Co., 233 P. 2d 357, 360. 
That was an action by a passenger in an automobile 
to recover for injuries suffered by her in a crossing ac-
cident. The usual conflict existed in testimony by the 
railroad that the whistle and bell were rung and testi-
mony by plaintiff that neither was heard. The court held 
that if the plaintiff was in a position where she would 
likely have heard the ringing bell her testimony was 
such that it would create a conflict with the positive testi-
mony of the railroad. It no longer is necessary in Utah 
to show that the individual was consciously listening or 
looking for the warning signal. While this may have 
been a requirement in the cases of Clark v. Union Pac. 
R. Co., 70 Utah 29, 257 P. 1050. and Anderson v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., 76 Utah 324, 289 P. 146, this Court stated 
in the Hudson case : 
"* * * Defendant now maintains that no jury 
issue of negligence in failing to sound a warning 
was made out, because it does not appear that 
Mrs. Hudson was affirmatively listening or pay-
ing attention to determine whether the train was 
going to whistle or not. Admittedly this was nece-
ssary under the Clark and Anderson cases, supra, 
in order to change the characterization of nega-
tive testimony that no warnings were heard to 
positive testimony to the effect that, 'I was listen-
ing for the whistle and bell but they were not 
given.' Such a distinction governing the relative 
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probative value of testimony and concluding 
plaintiff's right to a jury trial is not sound. All 
that need appear is that the witness was so situ-
ated in relation to the train at the time it is 
claimed the warnings were given that said warn-
ings 1C01tld have au:akened her attention to them. 
The circumstances bearing on her opportunity 
and capacity to hear, such as possible deafness, 
pronounced wind direction affecting sounds, the 
speed and noise of the train and of the car, topo-
graphy of the surrounding country, absorption 
in conversation or with her own thoughts or de-
vices and any other factors which would enable 
the fact finder to evaluate the probative force of 
her testimony should be considered. The con-
vincing power of testimony that a sound was not 
heard varies according to the opportunity of the 
witness giving it to hear and observe, but a pas-
senger in an automobile need not p·e:rsistently 
keep his ear cocked for the sound of a train. In 
this case the plaintiff is necessarily confined to 
negative evidence in proving the fact that the 
whistle or bell was not sounded. If such evidence 
is unworthy of belief simply because it is negative, 
then a plaintiff in like circumstances must nearly 
always fail. The issue is fundamentally a ques-
tion of the credibility of witnesses and consider-
ing the close proximity of the car to the train 
while they travelled parallel to each other, Mrs. 
Hudson was in a position where it is likely that 
she would have heard the whistle, or at least the 
bell, and as there is no evidence that her atten-
tion was so absorbed in other matters that she 
would not have heard, a jury question 1s pre-
sented." 
The Hudson case was a hearing case, the case at 
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bar a seeing case. We submit that as a practical matter 
a person's attention would be more readily attracted to 
moving lights in a dark background than to a sound. 
Plaintiff here was in a position to see and he looked 
and saw no lights. 
In the case at bar it comes to simply a matter of 
which witness to believe. The testimony of plaintiff 
quoted under the first point was that he did look but 
did not see anything. He also testified that when the 
caboose came into the rays of the locomotive head-
light he saw no light on the caboose. That there was 
only a short period of time in which he could make his 
observation does not eliminate the probative value of 
this testimony. H.e saw the caboose and he saw no light 
on it. It would not assist in making this determination 
for him to stand and gaze at the car. How long must a 
person look to see a light on a caboose~ Certainly if 
there were a light a glance would suffice to see it. 
Plaintiff under this testimony looked, saw the cab-
oose but saw no light (R. 40) : 
"Q. Did you see the lights~ 
"A. No sir. 
"Q. You had to look awfully fast~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You would testify there were no lights~ 
"A. Yes, there were no lights. 
"Q. You would say there were no lights on 
the caboose~ 
"A. I would say there were no lights on the 
caboose. 
"Q. There were no .lights inside the cab-
oose~ 
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~~ ... \. Xo lights. 
~~Q. No lights at all~ 
H ... \. That is right. 
HQ. It "\Yas completely dark~ 
H ... \. That is right." 
We submit that under all of the authorities this 
testimony given by the plaintiff created a conflict in 
the evidence and the testimony of the plaintiff who was 
in a position to see and looked and did not see would 
support a finding that there were no lights u-pon the 
caboose. 
Conflicts of fact in these railroad cases are of com-
mon occurrence. In many cases a watchman or a train-
man has testified to flagging a crossing and other per-
sons have testified to the contrary. These matters are 
ordinarily left to the determination of the jury. Cases 
in which such conflict exist are legion, but as examples 
we cite the following: Shreveport v. Vicksburg, S. & P. 
R. Co., 167 La. 157, 118 S.o. 872; Missouri P. R. Co. v. 
Powell, 196 Ark. 834, 120 S·.W. 2d 349; Ray v. Hines, 
118 Wash. 530, 203 P. 929; Missouri P.R. Co. v. Byrd, 
206 Ark. 369, 175 S.W. 2d 564; Mazanek v. Pennsylva.nia-
Reading Seashore Lines, 125 N.J.L. 394, 15 A. 2d 885; 
Cartwright v. Grand Trunk Western R·. Co., 288 Mich. 
316, 284 N.W. 727. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL AND 
THE COURTS SHOULD NOT USURP T·HE FUNCTIONS 
OF A JURY. 
Under our system of government and laws a 
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tribunal has been selected to determine conflicting ques-
tions of fact. Where a conflict exists one witness has 
testified to one thing and another witness has testified 
to the contrary. The jury must determine which one 
should be given credence. Under our laws eight citizens 
perform this task. In the case at bar eight citizens of 
this community sat on the jury. They saw and heard 
the plaintiff. They had an opportunity to face him, watch 
his expression, hear the certainty or uncertainty of his 
voice and were able to see and hear and become cogni-
zant of all those things which go to make up a person's 
mind on whether or not another is telling the truth. 
Those things cannot be placed in the printed pages of a 
transcript. It is imposs~ble for a court to make, a reason-
able determination of the credibility of a witness from 
the pages of a transcript. The witnesses who testified 
to lights and flagmen and signals were also before the 
jury. The jury could make a reasonable determination 
as to whether it would believe them and particularly 
whether it would believe them as against the plaintiff. 
The tendency of some courts is to believe that juries 
are not competent to perform the function of fact finding. 
These courts seem to feel that only the courts should 
make the determination. The only difficulty with this 
is that a court which does not recognize the function 
of a jury and invades its province is acting contrary to 
law. A jury is just as competent to make these factual 
determinations as any court. Juries are composed of 
citizens of the community who usually have some busi-
ness acumen. They are, in fact, in a better position than 
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an appellate court and they have an opportunity of dis-
cussing the n1a tter in the jury room during their de-
liberations and arriving at a result after· an exchange 
of ideas. True, they are layn1en but then truth or falsity 
is not a legal question. 
In the case at bar the defendant had the burden of 
showing that plaintiff did not look or that if he l~oked 
he did it ineffectively in that he did not see what was 
there to be seen. The burden of proof to show failure 
to exercise ordinary care was upon defendant. In order 
to believe that plaintiff was negligent it was necessary 
for the defendant to prove to the satisfaction of the 
jury by a preponderance of the evidence that a flagman 
flagged the crossing or that there were lights suffici-
ently strong on the caboose to have made it necessary 
that plaintiff see the caboose if he had looked. The jury 
concluded that defendant had failed in its burden. 
Why should this Court or the trial court usurp the 
function of the jury and say that the testimony of plain-
tiff cannot be believed or that defendant maintained 
its burden of prooff 
We submit that plaintiff was entitled to his right 
of trial by jury, guaranteed to him by the Constitution 
and by the common law system under which we operate. 
We respectfully submit that the jury ha.s made a deter-
mination of these matters in plaintiff's favor. That find-
ing should be respected. 
We close this point of the brief by a pertinent quo-
tation from Reid v. Maryland Casualty Co., 63 F. 2d 10, 
11: 
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"* * * District Judges are pronouncing no 
mere rigmarole when in law cases, they charge 
jurors that they are the sole and exclusive judges 
of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight 
to be given to their testimony. They are setting 
forth the very substance of a jury trial as guaran-
teed by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitu-
tion. Its purpose and aim 'is not to preserve mere 
matters of form and procedure, but substance of 
right. This requires that questions of fact in 
common-law actions shall be settled by a jury, and 
that the court shall not assume, directly or in-
directly, to take from the jury or to itself such 
prerogative.' Walker v. New Mexico & S. P. R. 
Co., 165 U.S. 593, 17 S. Ct. 421, 422, 41 L. Ed. 837. 
It requires that except in cases where the evidence 
is such that reasonable minds can draw only one 
conclusion from it upon the issues, cases tried to 
a jury must go to a jury for their verdict. Espe-
cially is this so where, as here, the case turns 
upon the credibility of the witnesses." 
c·ONCLUSION 
Defendant now contends that the court should have 
directed a verdict in favor of defendant on the grounds 
of plaintiff's contributory negligence. We submit that 
the Court cannot say as a matter of law that the defend-
ant has sustained this burden and it certainly should only 
be in extraordinary and exceptional cases where a court 
should direct a verdict in favor of the party who has 
the burden of proof. 
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\V·e submit that the judgment entered in favor of the 
defendant should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, W ALLAC·E, BLACK, 
ROBERTS & BLACK, 
D\VIGHT L. KING, 
Cottnsel for Plaintiff and Appellant, 
530 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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